

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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Annex

Communiqué of the fortieth session of the Central Organ
of the Organization of African Unity Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, meeting
at the ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa on
6 November 1997

The Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution held its fortieth session at the ambassadorial level on 6 November 1997. The session took place under the chairmanship of Mr. B. G. Godwyli, Ambassador of Ghana to Ethiopia and representative of the First Vice-Chairman of the Bureau of the Summit of OAU.

The Central Organ considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros and in the Republic of the Congo.

Situation in the Comoros

The Central Organ was of the view that the actions of the separatist movement on Anjouan represented a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of the Comoros and to the countries of the Indian Ocean in general. It also presented a serious precedent, likely to be emulated elsewhere in Africa and undermine one of the most fundamental principles of the OAU, namely, that of territorial integrity. Respect for this principle has thus far greatly contributed to the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent.

At the end of the deliberations, the Central Organ:

1. Encouraged the Secretary-General in his efforts to reactivate the negotiation process and to establish conditions for the convening, as soon as possible, of the international conference and gave its full support to the decision of the Secretary-General again to send his Special Envoy to the archipelagos of the Comoros to resume contact with all the parties concerned in order to promote a negotiated solution within the purview of the unity and territorial integrity of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros;
2. Requested the Secretary-General to continue to undertake in-depth consultations and investigations on the dynamics and evolution of the problems in the Comoros;
3. Authorized the deployment of OAU military observers in the Comoros. The goal of any such deployment would be to avert a worsening of the situation, and the restoration of a minimum level of confidence among the people of those islands where deployment occurred. In addition, deployment would aim to encourage the establishment of a climate conducive to inter-Comorian negotiations;

4. Reiterated its condemnation of the recent referendum on Anjouan and its consequences;

5. Called upon all Member States and the international community to declare null and void the result of the referendum held on 26 October 1997 in Anjouan and to reiterate their support for the efforts made by OAU for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the crisis in the Comoros;

6. Strongly urged all the Comorian parties to cooperate fully with OAU in its efforts and to refrain from any action likely to aggravate the situation and to complicate the efforts being undertaken for a peaceful and negotiated settlement with due regard to the unity, cohesion and territorial integrity of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros;

7. Requested the Secretary-General to urgently consider all appropriate measures which could be taken to contribute to the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros.

Situation in the Republic of the Congo

The Central Organ took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Republic of the Congo, and called upon all Member States and the international community to extend urgent humanitarian assistance for the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons as well as assistance to all the people of the Republic of the Congo.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1997/870
10 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 7 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF SWEDEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, has the honour to inform him of the following Swedish measures regarding Sierra Leone:

1. Entry and transit restrictions, paragraph 5:

In accordance with current regulations, citizens of Sierra Leone may not enter into or transit through Sweden without a visa. These regulations apply, irrespective of whether the individual concerned is a holder of a national passport, diplomatic passport or a service passport.

2. Provision of arms and related material, paragraph 6:

Swedish law generally prohibits the export of military equipment from Sweden without permission from the National Inspectorate for Strategic Products (the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) as amended in 1996:68, and the Military Equipment Ordinance (1992:1303) as amended in 1997:690).

In granting permission for exports of military equipment, certain guidelines are applied. These guidelines have been approved by Parliament and include, inter alia, an unconditional undertaking not to permit the export of military equipment in case a Security Council resolution prohibits such export to a certain country.

There have been no previous deliveries of military equipment from Sweden to Sierra Leone, and no permits have been issued for future such deliveries.

3. Provision of dual-use goods, petroleum and petroleum products, paragraph 6:

In the next few days, the European Union plans to adopt a Council regulation concerning the interruption of certain economic relations with Sierra Leone. The aim of the regulation is to implement the decision of the Security Council concerning control of exports of dual-use products and



petroleum and petroleum products to Sierra Leone. A European Union regulation is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in Sweden.

According to article 1 of the regulation, the following shall be prohibited:

1. To sell or supply petroleum and petroleum products listed in annex I, whether or not originated in the Community, in the territory of Sierra Leone;

2. To sell or supply in the territory of Sierra Leone goods designed or modified for military use, dual-use goods, spare parts and related technology for the aforementioned as specified in annex II;

3. Any activity the object or effect of which is, directly or indirectly, to promote the transactions or activities mentioned.

The prohibition of article 1, paragraphs 1 and 3, shall not apply in cases of:

(a) Supplies of petroleum and petroleum products to the democratically elected Government of Sierra Leone, at its request, and

(b) Supplies for verified humanitarian purposes or for the needs of the Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG), at the request of other Governments or United Nations agencies,

On the condition that, through the competent national authorities, a non-objection declaration has been obtained from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997), and the arrangements determined by this Committee for effective monitoring of delivery are being fully respected.

The regulation shall apply notwithstanding any rights conferred or obligations imposed by any international agreement signed or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted before the entry into force of the regulation.

The regulation shall apply within the territory of the European Community, including its air space and on any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a member State and to any person elsewhere who is a national of a member State and any body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a member State.

The regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Community.

Additional provisions concerning penalties to be imposed in the event of violations of the provisions of the regulation is found under the Swedish Act (1996:95) on Certain International Sanctions.



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.
GENERAL

A/52/589
S/1997/871
11 November 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: CHINESE AND ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda items 20, 56, 64, 71, 81, 88,
95, 98, 103, 112, 117, 152 and 157
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
LAUNCHING OF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
FOR DEVELOPMENT
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE
QUESTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS
MACROECONOMIC POLICY QUESTIONS
ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS
IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL SITUATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
UNITED NATIONS REFORM: MEASURES AND PROPOSALS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 11 November 1997 from the Permanent Representatives
of China and the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a joint statement of the United States of America and China, issued in Washington, D.C., on 29 October 1997 during the state visit of the President of the People's Republic of China to the United States of America (see annex).



A/52/589
S/1997/871
English
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We should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 20, 56, 64, 71, 81, 88, 95, 98, 103, 112, 117, 152 and 157, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bill RICHARDSON
Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
the United States of America
to the United Nations

(Signed) QIN Huasun
Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
the People's Republic of China
to the United Nations

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ANNEX

Joint statement of China and the United States of America
issued on 29 October 1997

At the invitation of President William J. Clinton of the United States of America, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China is paying a state visit to the United States from 26 October to 3 November 1997. This is the first state visit by the President of China to the United States in 12 years. President Jiang held formal talks with President Clinton in Washington, D.C., and also met with Vice-President Al Gore, Congressional leaders and other American leaders. Talks also were held between Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

The two Presidents had an in-depth and productive exchange of views on the international situation, China-United States relations and the important opportunities and challenges facing the two countries. They agree that a sound and stable relationship between China and the United States serves the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and American peoples and is important to fulfilling their common responsibility to work for peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century.

They agree that while China and the United States have areas of both agreement and disagreement, they have a significant common interest and a firm common will to seize opportunities and meet challenges cooperatively, with candour and a determination to achieve concrete progress. China and the United States have major differences on the question of human rights. At the same time, they also have great potential for cooperation in maintaining global and regional peace and stability; promoting world economic growth; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; advancing Asia-Pacific regional cooperation; combating narcotics-trafficking, international organized crime and terrorism; strengthening bilateral exchanges and cooperation in economic development, trade, law, environmental protection, energy, science and technology and education and culture, as well as engaging in military exchanges.

The two Presidents are determined to build towards a constructive strategic partnership between China and the United States through increasing cooperation to meet international challenges and promote peace and development in the world. To achieve this goal, they agree to approach China-United States relations from a long-term perspective on the basis of the principles of the three China-United States joint communiqués.

China stresses that the Taiwan question is the most important and sensitive central question in China-United States relations, and that the proper handling of this question in strict compliance with the principles set forth in the three China-United States joint communiqués holds the key to sound and stable growth of China-United States relations. The United States reiterates that it adheres to its 'one China' policy and the principles set forth in the three joint China-United States communiqués.

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As permanent members of the Security Council, China and the United States support the United Nations in its efforts, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to play a positive and effective role on global issues, including peacekeeping and the promotion of economic and social development. Both countries support efforts to reform the United Nations and to make the Security Council more representative, while retaining and improving its effectiveness. Stressing the need to put the United Nations on a firmer financial basis, both countries will participate actively in discussions on the scale of assessments in the United Nations.

As two major countries in the Asia-Pacific region, China and the United States are ready to strengthen their cooperation to meet various challenges and make positive contributions to promoting stability and prosperity in the region. Recognizing that maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is of great importance, the two countries are working through the four-party talks to help establish a durable peace on the peninsula, and will continue consultations to this end. They also stress that it is in the interest of the two countries to maintain peace and stability in other important regions, including the Middle East, the Gulf and South Asia.

The two Presidents agreed on a number of steps that will provide a framework for further promoting China-United States relations and strengthening their cooperation in international affairs.

High-level dialogue and consultations

China and the United States agree to regular visits by their Presidents to each other's capitals.

They agree to a Beijing-Washington presidential communications link to facilitate contact.

They also agree to regular exchanges of visits by cabinet and subcabinet officials to consult on political, military, security and arms control issues.

Cooperation on energy and the environment

China and the United States reaffirm the importance of bilateral cooperation across the broad range of environmental issues, as evidenced by the establishment of the China-United States Forum on Environment and Development in March 1997.

They consider it a critical challenge to develop and use energy resources efficiently, protect the global environment and promote environmentally sound growth and development. Accordingly, they agree to strengthen their cooperation in energy and environment through an initiative to accelerate clean energy projects and to transfer related technologies. The principal areas of cooperation will be in clean energy, urban air pollution control and rural electrification. This initiative also will foster broader cooperation on global environmental issues such as climate change, desertification and biodiversity. China's State Planning Commission and the United States Energy Department have signed the China-United States initiative on Energy and Environment Cooperation

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to promote effective cooperation in those fields, including the use of clean energy.

Economic relations and trade

The two Presidents are prepared to take positive and effective measures to expand China-United States trade and economic ties. As both economies move into the twenty-first century, information technology will be critical to spurring technological innovation and improving productivity. In this regard, China indicated its intention to participate as soon as possible in the Information Technology Agreement. In addition, in the context of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, China will continue to make further substantial tariff reductions. China and the United States agree that the full participation of China in the multilateral trading system is in their mutual interest. To that end, they agree to intensify negotiations on market access, including tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, standards and agriculture and on implementation of WTO principles so that China can accede to WTO on a commercially meaningful basis on the earliest possible date.

Peaceful nuclear cooperation

China and the United States agree that it is in their mutual interest to cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To that end, they each have taken the steps necessary to implement the China-United States Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation concluded in 1985. In addition, China's State Planning Commission and the United States Department of Energy have signed an agreement of intent to promote peaceful nuclear cooperation and research between the two countries.

Non-proliferation

China and the United States agree to work to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force on the earliest possible date. They also agree to pursue at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament the early start of formal negotiations on a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials used in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

China and the United States reiterate their commitment not to provide any assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and nuclear-explosion programmes. China has placed controls on exports of nuclear and dual-use materials and related technology and will take further measures to strengthen dual-use export controls by mid-1998. The United States will continue to enforce firm controls on the export of nuclear and dual-use materials and related technology. As original parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, China and the United States agree to cooperate in implementing the Convention within a multilateral framework. Both countries agree on the importance of government oversight of chemical-related exports. China and the United States agree to build on the 1994 Joint Statement on Missile Non-Proliferation. They reaffirm their respective commitments to the guidelines and parameters of the missile technology control regime.

Human rights

China and the United States both recognize the positive role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments in promoting human rights. They reiterate their commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

While the two countries have not resolved their differences on human rights, they have agreed to discuss them through dialogue at both governmental and non-governmental levels in the spirit of equality and mutual respect. The two countries agree to hold discussions on the structure and functions of a non-governmental organization forum on human rights.

Cooperation in the field of law

China and the United States agree that promoting cooperation in the field of law serves the interests and needs of both countries.

They will strengthen cooperation in combating international organized crime, narcotics-trafficking, alien smuggling, counterfeiting and money-laundering. To that end, they intend to establish a joint liaison group for law enforcement cooperation composed of representatives of the relevant agencies of both Governments. They agree to begin consultations on mutual legal assistance aimed at concluding a mutual legal assistance agreement.

China and the United States will assign counter-narcotics officers to their respective embassies on a reciprocal basis.

Recognizing the importance China and the United States both attach to legal exchanges, they intend to establish a joint liaison group to pursue cooperative activities in this area. These may include exchanges of legal experts, training of judges and lawyers, strengthening legal information systems and the exchange of legal materials, sharing ideas about legal assistance, consulting on administrative procedures and strengthening commercial law and arbitration.

As part of this programme of legal cooperation, China's Minister of Justice will visit the United States in November 1997 at the invitation of the United States Attorney-General.

Military-to-military relations

China and the United States have reached agreement on the establishment of a consultation mechanism to strengthen military maritime safety, which will enable their maritime and air forces to avoid accidents, misunderstandings and miscalculations.

They agree to share information and discuss issues related to their respective experiences in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Science and technology, education and cultural exchanges

The China-United States Joint Commission on Science and Technology will continue to guide the active bilateral scientific and technological cooperation programme, which involves more than 30 agreements reached since 1979, and will promote the further use of science and technology to solve national and global problems. China and the United States also will identify areas for cooperative projects using space for earth science research and practical applications.

China and the United States will expand educational and cultural exchanges. Both Presidents believe that increased people-to-people exchanges will help to cultivate long-term bilateral relations.

President Jiang Zemin expressed his thanks to President Clinton and the American people for their warm reception and invited President Clinton to visit China in 1998. President Clinton accepted this invitation with pleasure.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/872
12 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Chile, Costa Rica, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of
Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, and in particular its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 1060 (1996) of 12 June 1996, 1115 (1997) of 21 June 1997, and 1134 (1997) of 23 October 1997,

Taking note with grave concern of the letter of 29 October 1997 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/829) conveying the unacceptable decision of the Government of Iraq to seek to impose conditions on its cooperation with the Special Commission, of the letter of 2 November 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations to the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission (S/1997/837, annex) which reiterated the unacceptable demand that the reconnaissance aircraft operating on behalf of the Special Commission be withdrawn from use and which implicitly threatened the safety of such aircraft, and of the letter of 6 November 1997 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/855) admitting that Iraq has moved dual-capable equipment which is subject to monitoring by the Special Commission,

Also taking note with grave concern of the letters of 30 October 1997 (S/1997/830) and 2 November 1997 (S/1997/836) from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to the President of the Security Council advising that the Government of Iraq had denied entry to Iraq to two Special Commission officials on 30 October 1997 and 2 November 1997 on the grounds of their nationality, and of the letters of 3 November 1997 (S/1997/837), 4 November 1997 (S/1997/843), 5 November 1997 (S/1997/851) and 7 November 1997 (S/1997/864) from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to the President of the Security Council advising that the Government of Iraq had denied entry to sites designated for inspection by the Special Commission on 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 November 1997 to Special Commission inspectors on the grounds of their nationality, and of the additional information in the Executive Chairman's letter of 5 November 1997 to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/851) that the Government of Iraq has moved significant pieces of dual-capable equipment subject to monitoring by



the Special Commission, and that monitoring cameras appear to have been tampered with or covered,

Welcoming the diplomatic initiatives, including that of the high-level mission of the Secretary-General, which have taken place in an effort to ensure that Iraq complies unconditionally with its obligations under the relevant resolutions,

Deeply concerned at the report of the high-level mission of the Secretary-General on the results of its meetings with the highest levels of the Government of Iraq,

Recalling that its resolution 1115 (1997) expressed its firm intention, unless the Special Commission advised the Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution, to impose additional measures on those categories of Iraqi officials responsible for the non-compliance,

Recalling also that its resolution 1134 (1997) reaffirmed its firm intention, if inter alia the Special Commission reports that Iraq is not in compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997), to adopt measures which would oblige States to refuse the entry into or transit through their territories of all Iraqi officials and members of the Iraqi armed forces who are responsible for or participate in instances of non-compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997),

Recalling further the Statement of its President of 29 October 1997 (S/PRST/1997/49) in which the Council condemned the decision of the Government of Iraq to try to dictate the terms of its compliance with its obligation to cooperate with the Special Commission, and warned of the serious consequences of Iraq's failure to comply immediately and fully and without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under the relevant resolutions,

Reiterating the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq,

Determined to ensure immediate and full compliance without conditions or restrictions by Iraq with its obligations under the relevant resolutions,

Determining that this situation continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Condemns the continued violations by Iraq of its obligations under the relevant resolutions to cooperate fully and unconditionally with the Special Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate, including its unacceptable decision of 29 October 1997 to seek to impose conditions on cooperation with the Special Commission, its refusal on 30 October 1997 and 2 November 1997 to allow entry to Iraq to two Special Commission officials on the grounds of their nationality, its denial of entry on 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 November 1997 to sites designated by the Special Commission for inspection to Special Commission inspectors on the

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grounds of their nationality, its implicit threat to the safety of the reconnaissance aircraft operating on behalf of the Special Commission, its removal of significant pieces of dual-use equipment from their previous sites, and its tampering with monitoring cameras of the Special Commission;

2. Demands that the Government of Iraq rescind immediately its decision of 29 October 1997;

3. Demands also that Iraq cooperate fully and immediately and without conditions or restrictions with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance;

4. Decides, in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 1134 (1997), that States shall without delay prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of all Iraqi officials and members of the Iraqi armed forces who were responsible for or participated in the instances of non-compliance detailed in paragraph 1 above, provided that the entry of a person into a particular State on a specified date may be authorized by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its own territory to its own nationals, or to persons carrying out bona fide diplomatic assignments, or missions approved by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990);

5. Decides also, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1134 (1997), to designate in consultation with the Special Commission a list of individuals whose entry or transit will be prevented under the provisions of paragraph 4 above, and requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to develop guidelines and procedures as appropriate for the implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 4 above, and to transmit copies of these guidelines and procedures, as well as a list of the individuals designated, to all Member States;

6. Decides that the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 above shall terminate one day after the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission reports to the Council that Iraq is allowing the Special Commission inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of the Special Commission, as well as to officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom the Special Commission wishes to interview so that the Special Commission may fully discharge its mandate;

7. Decides that the reviews provided for in paragraphs 21 and 28 of resolution 687 (1991) shall resume in April 1998 in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution 1134 (1997), provided that the Government of Iraq shall have complied with paragraph 2 above;

8. Expresses the firm intention to take further measures as may be required for the implementation of this resolution;

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9. Reaffirms the responsibility of the Government of Iraq under the relevant resolutions to ensure the safety and security of the personnel and equipment of the Special Commission and its inspection teams;

10. Reaffirms also its full support for the authority of the Special Commission under its Executive Chairman to ensure the implementation of its mandate under the relevant resolutions of the Council;

11. Decides to remain seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL


S/1997/873
11 November 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to transmit herewith a letter dated 11 November 1997 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, addressed to you concerning relations with the Special Commission.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 11 November 1997 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

I should like to refer to the letter dated 29 October 1997 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, addressed to the President of the Security Council. That letter announced the decision taken by the Government of Iraq that it was ready to continue its cooperation with the Special Commission and to arrive, with the Commission, at balanced arrangements enabling it to fully discharge its task in accordance with the legal framework and without exaggeration, provided that no individuals of American nationality participated in any activity of the Special Commission inside Iraq, particularly inspections, interviews, and aerial and ground surveillance.

Then, on 30 October 1997, the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, which reports to the Special Commission, informed the National Monitoring Service, which is the Iraqi agency for monitoring the work of the Centre, of the suspension of the inspection activities upon instructions from Mr. Richard Butler, Executive Chairman of the Special Commission. On 3 November 1997 the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre resumed its work, sending notifications and dates of intended inspections to the National Monitoring Service, in accordance with the usual procedure. It also declared the intention of the various inspection groups to carry out the inspection activities, with the details and dates given below. Each time a group was preparing to depart from the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, it was informed by the Iraqi authorities that the Americans were not permitted to carry out inspection activities. At the same time, the Iraqi authorities informed the group that they were ready to lend their full cooperation and assistance in order to facilitate inspection by the remaining members of the team, and to ensure the success of their mission. In addition, the Iraqi authorities reiterated their position each time a group arrived at the designated inspection site, and on each occasion, the group cancelled its activities immediately, or while travelling to the inspection site, or after its arrival at the site, without true justification.

The details of these operations, numbered in chronological order, are as follows:

Monday, 3 November 1997

1. The missile group MG-15 on a visit to Al-Karama installation.
2. The chemical group CG-12, which divided into three subsidiary groups, the first of which headed for a private firm that sells water pumps in the district of Said Sultan Ali in Baghdad; the second headed in an unknown direction; and third headed towards the Nimer leather-tanning company.

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3. The nuclear group NMG-58, whose task was to undertake a surprise visit for an unknown purpose.
4. The biological group BG-11, whose task was to undertake a visit also for an unknown purpose.
5. Two groups of inspection teams from CSCI-1, together with the first chemical group and the biological group, on their visit for an unknown purpose.

Tuesday, 4 November 1997

1. The missile group MG-15 on a surprise visit to the Ibn Al-Haytham Centre.
2. The chemical group CG-12 on its visit to the Ibn Al-Bitar Centre together with a group from the CSCI-1 team and inspectors from the nuclear group.
3. The biological group BG-11 on its visit to the Ibn Al-Bitar Centre together with the CSCI-1 team.

Wednesday, 5 November 1997

1. The missile group MG-15 on its visit to Al-Dawra refinery and the inspection of heavy engineering equipment, jointly with a biological group and a chemical group and groups from the CSCI-1 team.
2. The chemical group CG-12 on its visit to the same site mentioned in number 1 above.
3. The nuclear group NG-58 undertaking a surprise visit for an unannounced purpose.
4. The biological group BG-11 on its visit to Al-Dawra refinery and the inspection of heavy engineering equipment, jointly with a chemical group, a missile group and two groups from the CSCI-1 team.
5. The import group EG-8 upon undertaking a surprise visit for an unannounced purpose.

6. Two groups from the CSCI-1 team together with missile, chemical and biological monitoring groups on a visit for an unannounced purpose.

Thursday, 6 November 1997

1. The missile group MG-15 on a visit to Al-Karama general plant.
2. The chemical group CG-12 on a visit to the Ibn Al-Bitar Centre jointly with a group from the CSCI-1 team.
3. The nuclear group NG-58 on a surprise visit for an unannounced purpose.
4. The biological group BG-11 on a visit to the Ibn Al-Bitar Centre jointly with a group from the CSCI-1 team.

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5. The import group EG-8 on a surprise visit for an unannounced purpose.

6. Two groups from the CSCI-1 inspection team jointly with chemical and biological monitoring groups on a visit for an unannounced purpose.

Friday, 7 November 1997

1. The missile group MG-15 on a visit to the Al-Karama general plant.

2. The chemical group CG-12, which divided into two groups, the first of which joined the CSCI-1 team, while the second visited the general vegetable-oil enterprise.

3. The biological group BG-11 on a surprise visit to the Ibn Al-Bitar Centre jointly with the first chemical group and two groups from the CSCI-1 team.

4. The import group EG-8 on a surprise visit for an unannounced purpose.

5. Two groups from the CSCI-1 inspection team together with chemical and biological monitoring groups on a visit for an unannounced purpose.

Saturday, 8 November 1997

1. The missile group MG-15 on a surprise visit to Al-Karama general plant.

2. The chemical group CG-12, which separated into two groups, the first of which visited the Ibn Al-Bitar Centre together with a biological group, and two groups from the CSCI-1 team and a second group visited the general vegetable-oil enterprise.

3. The biological group BG-11 on surprise visit to the Ibn Al-Bitar Centre, together with the first chemical group and two groups from the CSCI-1 team.

4. The import group EG-8 on a surprise visit for an unannounced purpose.

5. Two groups from the CSCI-1 inspection team together with chemical and biological monitoring groups on a visit for an unannounced purpose.

Sunday, 9 November 1997

1. The missile group MG-15 on a surprise visit to Al-Harith general installation.

2. Two groups from the chemical group CG-12 and a group from the CSCI-1 team on a surprise inspection of the road leading to the Rashid general installation.

3. The biological BG-11 on a surprise visit to the Kandi company jointly with a group from the CSCI-1 team.

4. Two groups from the CSCI-1 inspection team together with chemical and biological monitoring groups on a visit for an unannounced purpose.

As you have seen, the relevant Iraqi authorities have indicated their readiness to cooperate with all inspection teams that do not include American individuals, and the Iraqi side will continue to afford all facilities and requirements to enable the inspection and monitoring teams to complete their missions successfully.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Iraq
Baghdad, 11 November 1997



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/874
12 November 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States aircraft continued over the period 30 October to 11 November 1997 and that the aircraft in question carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

Your intervention is requested with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State by these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations of Iraq's airspace and damage caused,
30 October-11 November 1997

1. In the northern region 169 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following cities and towns: Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul, Tall Afar, Aqrah, Amadiyah, Rawanduz, Baibo and Ayn Zalah.
2. In the southern region 760 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basrah, Chabaish, Artawi, Busayyah, Shinafiyah, Qurnah, Rifa'i, Hamzah, Jalibah, Shatrah, Salman, Qal'ar Sukkar, Hayy, Taqtaqanah, Afak, Ali al-Gharbi, Ali al-Sharqi, Najaf, Kut, Amarah, Hashimiyah, Ma'aniyah, Aziziyah East, Ar'ar, Qal'at Salih, Nu'maniyah and Rumaythah.
3. On 10 occasions United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated the Republic of Iraq's airspace in the southern region before leaving in the direction of Kuwait.
4. At 0814 hours on 30 October 1997 three United States warplanes circled Mina' al-Bakr.
5. At 0900, 1005, 1110, 1125, 1140, and 1215 hours on 30 October 1997 United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace in the Umm Qasr area.
6. At 1210 hours on 6 November 1997 a formation of United States aircraft broke the sound barrier in the Tall Kayf area.
7. At 1033 hours on 7 November 1997 a formation of United States aircraft broke the sound barrier in the Tall Afar area.
8. At 1101 hours on 9 November 1997 a formation of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier in the Jalibah area.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL


S/1997/875
12 November 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 12 November 1997 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning violations by American aircraft of Iraqi airspace during the period between 29 October and 11 November 1997.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter, together with the attached tables of violations, distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex I

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 12 November 1997 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to our letter of 18 July 1997 addressed to the President of the Security Council, and recalling our position expressed therein, we find it necessary and urgent to inform you that the American violations of Iraq's sovereignty and the integrity of its airspace have reached a critical level. The violations of Iraq's airspace by American warplanes have increased along with the escalation of American threats to unleash military aggression against Iraq.

The American warplanes violated Iraq's airspace in northern and southern Iraq 984 times, of which 169 violations occurred in northern Iraq and 815 in southern Iraq, between 29 October and 11 November 1997. Enclosed with this letter you will find two tables indicating the increasing gravity of these violations.

As you know, such grave acts by a permanent member of the Security Council constitute not only a violation of the sovereignty of an independent State and founding Member of the United Nations and of the Charter of the Organization, but also a violation of a principle laid down in Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which was adopted, as you and the world at large are aware, under special influence and pressure from the United States.

In the face of these continual violations, breaches and trespasses, and against a background of constant American threats and the possibility of the use of military means by the United States, Iraq will find itself forced, in the absence of any alternative, to defend its sovereignty and security.

We should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq
Baghdad, 12 November 1997

Annex II

[Original: Arabic]

Ministry of Foreign AffairsDepartment of International Organizations and Conferences

Number of American air violations of northern and southern Iraq
between 29 October and 11 November 1997

northern Iraq	southern Iraq
169	815

Total: 984

Number of sorties of enemy warplanes over the two no-fly zones
between 29 October and 11 November 1997

Dates	Sorties over northern Iraq	Sorties over southern Iraq	Sorties of the TR-1* over southern Iraq
29/10		44	1
30/10		39	1
31/10	12	35	1
1/11	24	49	1
2/11	12	47	1
3/11	26	69	1
4/11	22	81	
5/11	18	87	1
6/11	28	60	
7/11	15	45	1
8/11		51	1
9/11		58	1
10/11	12	76	
11/11		63	1
Subtotal	169	804	11

* The TR-1 is an American reconnaissance spy plane which flies at an altitude of 20,000 metres and at a speed of 600 km/hour over southern Iraq only.



General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/52/668
S/1997/876
12 November 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 37
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 11 November 1997 from the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa and the arbitrary practices against the civilian inhabitants in which it engages on a daily basis, I have the honour to notify you of the series of such incidents that took place in October 1997.

3 October 1997

At 0600 hours outlying areas of Tulin, Qabrikha, Sawwanah and Majdal Silm came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1130 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area and made intensive low-altitude overflights of Iqlim al-Tuffah.

At 1140 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Damur area of Shuf district and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1300 hours outlying areas of Majdal Silm, Qabrikha, Tulin and Sawwanah came under Israeli artillery fire.

4 October 1997

At 0500 hours outlying areas of Kafr Rumman and Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and the vicinity of the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa came under Israeli artillery fire.

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5 October 1997

At 0930 hours an explosive charge exploded on the Hulah - Mays al-Jabal road in Marj Uyun district, killing a woman and her son.

At 2150 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Libbaya in Western Bekaa district and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

7 October 1997

At 1110 hours three shells fell in the vicinity of the Mashgharah vocational school. This was followed by a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire from Israeli and Lahad militia forces in Tumat Niha.

8 October 1997

At 1230 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at high altitudes.

At 1345 hours Israeli warplanes again overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas but at low altitudes.

At 1400 hours outlying areas of Majdal Silm, Khirbat Silm, Sawwanah, Qabrikha, Tulin, Jumayjimah and Shaqra came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1625 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1645 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at low altitudes and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

9 October 1997

At 0800 hours Israeli forces directed heavy bursts of fire at people picking olives in an outlying area of Yuhmur in Nabatiyah district.

11 October 1997

At 1440 hours the hills to the west of Maydun and Ayn al-Tinah came under Israeli artillery fire, and at 1620 hours the shelling was extended to include the southern Mashgharah road.

13 October 1997

At 1045 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at medium altitude and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

14 October 1997

At 0530 hours outlying areas of Nabatiyah, Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and Kafr Rumman came under artillery fire from Israeli positions in the border strip. The shelling was extended to include outlying areas of Arabsalim, Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar and Luwayzah, the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills and areas along the Zahrani River.

At 1220 hours Israeli warplanes attacked outlying areas of Nabi Shit in the Qantarah locality of Baalbek district.

At 1930 hours outlying areas of Yuhmur in Nabatiyah district came under Israeli artillery fire.

15 October 1997

At 0415 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area and strafed the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks. Five artillery shells fired from Israeli positions in the border strip also fell in the vicinity of the barracks.

At 1630 hours outlying areas of Qabrikha, Tulin and Majdal Silm came under Israeli artillery fire.

16 October 1997

At 1330 hours outlying areas of Jibal al-Butm and Siddiqin in Tyre district came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1930 hours outlying areas of Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar, Jba', Nabatiyah al-Fawqa, Kafr Tibnit, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Zawtar al-Gharbiyah in Nabatiyah district came under Israeli artillery fire.

17 October 1997

At 1150 hours the southern part of Mashgharah and the vicinity of the vocational school came under Israeli artillery fire. Two citizens were injured.

At 1540 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at high altitudes.

At 1740 hours outlying areas of Jba', Jarju', Arabsalim and Ayn Bu Siwar and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1830 hours the vicinity of the abandoned barracks in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa came under Israeli artillery fire.

18 October 1997

At 1730 hours outlying areas of Jba', Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar and Arabsalim came under Israeli artillery fire.

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At 1800 hours the Mashgharah, Maydun and Ayn al-Tinah hills in Western Bekaa district came under Israeli artillery fire. Israeli helicopters also overflew the area and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army. The shelling and the overflights stopped at 2000 hours.

At 2300 hours the Israeli artillery bombardment resumed in outlying areas of Jba' and was accompanied by bursts of medium-weapons fire. A shop was set on fire and a citizen was wounded.

19 October 1997

At 0630 hours outlying areas of Kafr Rumman and the Lebanese Army position in the town received bursts of heavy fire from Israeli forces on Tuhrah hill. One of those manning the position was wounded in the head.

At 0925 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at medium altitudes.

At 2330 hours the Ayn al-Tinah, Maydun and Mashgharah hills came under Israeli artillery bombardment. Israeli helicopters also overflew the towns in question and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

20 October 1997

At 1745 hours the Ayn al-Tinah hills and the southern Mashgharah mountains came under Israeli artillery fire, and at 1815 hours outlying areas of Libbaya came under similar fire.

At 1835 hours outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa, Kafr Rumman, Zawtar al-Gharbiyah and Zawtar al-Sharqiyah as well as the vicinity of the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2130 hours Israeli helicopters overflew Maydun, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Zawtar al-Gharbiyah. This was accompanied by bursts of fire from the Israeli positions opposite.

21 October 1997

At 1530 hours outlying areas of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Zawtar al-Gharbiyah came under Israeli artillery fire. Some 20 shells of various calibres landed there.

At 2150 hours outlying areas of Qabrikha, Sawwanah and Majdal Silm came under Israeli artillery fire.

22 October 1997

At 1030 hours the security situation in the Tumat Niha area in Jazzin district grew tense and clashes took place between men of the Lebanese national

resistance and Lahad militia elements in which all types of weapons were used. Calm was restored at 1200 hours.

At 1030 hours outlying areas of Kafra, Yatar and Haddatha came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1100 hours the southern part of Mashgharah and the vicinity of the vocational school came under artillery fire and received bursts of machine-gun fire from Israeli positions in Tumat Niha. The artillery bombardment and bursts of fire stopped at 1400 hours.

At 1530 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at high altitudes.

At 1530 hours several waves of Israeli warplanes attacked the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills and Luwayzah. They fired a number of air-to-surface missiles and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

24 October 1997

At 0930 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area.

At 1215 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes.

At 1730 hours outlying areas of Shaqra, Safad al-Battikh, Majdal Silm, Sawwanah and Khirbat Silm came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2300 hours outlying areas of Jba', Ayn Bu Siwar, Jarju' and Arabsalim came under Israeli artillery fire.

25 October 1997

Between 0125 and 0140 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the Na'imah hills.

26 October 1997

At 0500 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim, Jarju', Luwayzah, Ayn Qana and Ayn Bu Siwar, the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills and the Jba'-Kafr Fila wadi came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 0530 hours outlying areas of Majdal Silm, Khirbat Silm, Tulin, Qabrikha, Ghanduriyah, Ayta al-Jabal, Tibnin and Bra'shit came under Israeli artillery fire. A shell fell on the home of Muhammad Ahmad Nadir. His child was injured and serious damage was done to the house.

At 0545 hours outlying areas of Mansuri, Majdal Zun, Zibqin, Shu'aytiyah, Jibal al-Butm and Siddiqin in Tyre district came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 0630 hours an artillery shell fired by Israeli forces in the border strip fell in the garden of the home of Amin Hanna Faris in Sarba, Nabatiyah district. Its detonation caused serious damage to the building.

At 0820 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon at high altitudes.

At 1545 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at high altitudes. They again overflew those areas but at low altitudes at 1615 hours. They carried out mock attacks and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1610 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at low altitudes and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1830 hours outlying areas of Luwayzah, the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills and the Jba'-Kafr Fila wadi came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2200 hours Israeli helicopters overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas, dropping heat balloons in the latter area.

27 October 1997

At 1130 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim, areas along the Zahrani River and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1315 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at medium altitudes.

At 1410 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at medium altitudes.

28 October 1997

At 0800 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Bint Jubayl area, carrying out mock attacks and dropping smoke bombs in the Wadi al-Hujayr area.

At 0820 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area at medium altitudes.

At 0910 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at medium altitudes.

At 0915 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at medium altitudes. This continued until 1730 hours.

At 1600 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area.

At 2000 hours outlying areas of Frun, Ghanduriyah, Tulin, Qabrikha and Majdal Silm came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2010 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 2025 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Nabatiyah at low altitudes.

At 2040 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Na'imah hills and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

29 October 1997

At 0930 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at high altitudes.

At 1400 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon at high altitudes.

At 1500 hours Mansuri and Majdal Zun in Tyre district came under Israeli artillery fire.

30 October 1997

At 0920 hours the Ayn al-Tinah hills and Jabal Mashgharah heights came under artillery fire. One citizen was wounded.

At 0930 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas at low altitudes, carrying out mock attacks in the latter area. The hills around Qilya also came under Israeli artillery fire while warplanes carried out low-level overflights.

At 1445 hours parts of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, Yuhmur, Qa'qa'iyat al-Jisr and Mazra'at al-Hamra and areas along the Litani River came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1630 hours the Ayn al-Tinah heights and the vicinity of the vocational school in the southern part of Mashgharah came under Israeli artillery fire.

31 October 1997

At 0800 hours the Ayn al-Tinah and Mashgharah hills in Western Bekaa district came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1015 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes.

At 1645 hours Israeli warplanes attacked areas along the course of the Nab' al-Tasah, firing two air-to-surface missiles. They also overflew the Nabatiyah area.

At 1700 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns the continued Israeli occupation and these fresh attacks and arbitrary practices inflicted on the Lebanese

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population, which have left a number of casualties and have caused further serious damage to property.

Like previous attacks, this new series is in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and constitutes a breach of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of basic human rights.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/877
12 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 6 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT
MISSION OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to the note dated 16 October 1997 has the honour to inform him that the Lebanese Government totally abides by the provisions of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997 and that the competent authorities have been duly advised to comply with operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of that resolution.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/878
12 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 7 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to the note verbale dated 16 October 1997 and resolution 1132 (1997), adopted by the Security Council on 8 October 1997, has the honour to inform him of the measures taken by the Government of the Czech Republic to give effect to the provisions set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the above-mentioned resolution.

The Government of the Czech Republic has decided to suspend the granting of visas to members of the military junta and adult members of their families, in conformity with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997).

As to the implementation of the provisions encompassed in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997), it calls for the adoption of relevant law by the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The Government of the Czech Republic will convey the necessary documentation to the Parliament of the Czech Republic for approval shortly. Moreover, the arms embargo against Sierra Leone has been practically implemented through the licensing system which allows the Government to react promptly on the imposition or cancellation of the arms embargo on the part of the Security Council.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/879
12 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to his note verbale dated 16 October 1997, has the honour to convey the following:

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is currently in the process of taking all the necessary measures in order to give effect to the provisions set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/880
12 November 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I refer to my letter dated 6 November 1997 addressed to you (S/1997/857) and to the consultations held by the Security Council on 7 November, and I should like to place on record the points set forth hereunder.

1. I should like, on behalf of my country, to express recognition and appreciation to the distinguished members of the Security Council who turned the Council's consultations into a serious meeting in the course of which they addressed the practice of the automatic and routine renewal of sanctions and clearly placed on record the positions adopted by their countries in support of rectitude and of my country and its demands as set forth in my aforesaid letter. I should also like to express appreciation to those who preferred silence in the Council, inasmuch as their silence was more eloquent than any words. By their silence they too stood by my country, which was not present in the Council.

2. My country has complied fully with all the Council's resolutions, in that:

(a) It acceded to the requests of the United Kingdom with regard to the Irish Republican Army.

(b) It deferred to France in the matter of cooperating fully with the French examining magistrate whose letter to his country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he expresses his appreciation "of the way in which Libya cooperated with French justice in this inquiry", has been circulated in a Security Council document (S/1997/868, annex).

(c) It has condemned terrorism in all its forms, and it has on many occasions invited the United Nations to send whoever can enable it to verify the fact that my country has no connection with so-called terrorism. The United Nations itself has been prevented by one of its Members from undertaking this task.

Over and above all the foregoing, my country has responded positively to international proposals made by respected regional and international

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organizations and by a number of countries. It has agreed that its two citizens under suspicion should appear before a just and fair court.

3. Most of the peoples and countries of the world do not support the imposition of sanctions on my country. Indeed, they reject their imposition and support my country. They have affirmed their support for our demands that the sanctions be lifted forthwith. The support of the international community for my country has its reasons, and the most important of these are as follows:

(a) That the sanctions policy in general is rejected by States and peoples, including the peoples of those States that use sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy;

(b) That sanctions inflict direct and serious damage on peoples;

(c) That sanctions are imposed for indeterminate periods of time, and that once they are imposed they are not lifted;

(d) That, by virtue of the resolutions imposing them and the consequences of their application, sanctions are to be regarded as a flagrant violation of human rights;

(e) That the policy of sanctions, especially that imposed on my country, is invoked in violation of the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 27, 31, 33 and 36);

(f) That Libya has complied fully with the demands made of it;

(g) That the delay in implementing the provisions of the Council's resolutions that have yet to be given effect is due to the two countries concerned and is their responsibility, and that its consequences should not be borne by Libya and its people;

(h) That the embargo resolutions were imposed on Libya during the first years of the frenzied turmoil caused by the breakdown in the international equilibrium;

(i) That sanctions, and especially economic sanctions, represent a policy that is pursued by the United States of America against all those countries that reject its hegemony and that, with the breakdown in the international equilibrium, they have come to be applied by means of resolutions that the United States has the Security Council adopt against those same countries.

4. The deliberations of the members of the Council and my meetings with them have again confirmed that there is no problem between the Security Council and my country. It is rather the case that the problem has been fabricated by the United States and the United Kingdom for use against my country for political purposes. The question of the regrettable incident involving Pan Am flight 103 over the village of Lockerbie and the victims of that incident is no more than a pretext that these two countries have been using in order to achieve their political objectives.

5. My country has been prevented from exercising the right accorded in Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of the United Nations because the two countries concerned are afraid that Member States may subsequently seek to exercise the same right. This would entail their full exposure to world public opinion and, in particular, to public opinion in those countries themselves, to which they give the delusion that the international community supports them in their policies. This is at variance with the truth and with the real state of affairs. They also lack any sound argument or logic that might support their allegations against my country, and so they have preferred to shirk confrontation.

At a time when my country, together with the entire international community, is looking forward to a day when the Security Council will restore its credibility, comply with the Charter, free itself completely from the hegemony of a single State and rectify the mistakes forced upon it while the frenzied turmoil was at its apogee, I should like to place on record once more the following desiderata:

(a) The sanctions imposed on my country must be lifted, because they represent the "collective punishment" of an entire people on grounds of the mere suspicion of two persons who are its citizens, who have not been questioned, who have not been brought to trial and who have not, to this day, been condemned in accordance with any judicial verdict. How can the punishment precede the verdict? How can a people five million strong that has done no wrong be punished?

(b) The Council must not accept any postponement, by any party, of the implementation of paragraph 2 of its resolution 748 (1992), particularly since those preventing the Council from implementing it are the same as those that made the demand and that framed it for the purposes of the resolution in question.

(c) The two suspects should be tried expeditiously by a just and fair court at a venue that is untainted by their prior condemnation. It goes without saying that the Security Council has never adopted anything that requires my country to extradite its citizens to a foreign State, because in doing so the Council would be acting ultra vires. It would also be a shameful violation of human rights should my country yield in such an eventuality.

(d) An envoy should be sent to my country in order to investigate the humanitarian situation created by the implementation of resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993).

(e) My country insists on exercising, at an appropriate time, the right conferred in Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter without the introduction of manoeuvres that may abrogate the letter and substance of the Articles indicated.

I should be most grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abuzed Omar DORDA
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/881
12 November 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 12 November 1997 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning violations by American aircraft of Iraqi airspace during the period between 29 October and 11 November 1997.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter, together with the attached tables of violations, distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 12 November 1997 from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to the letter dated 5 August 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to you, concerning the continual violations by American aircraft of the integrity of Iraq's airspace, and also with reference to our letters dated 18 July 1997 and 12 November 1997 addressed to the President of the Security Council, and recalling our position set forth in those letters, we find it necessary and urgent to inform you that the American violations of Iraq's sovereignty and the integrity of its airspace have reached a critical level. The violations of Iraq's airspace by American warplanes have increased along with the escalation of American threats to unleash military aggression against Iraq.

The American warplanes violated Iraq's airspace in northern and southern Iraq 984 times, of which 169 violations occurred in northern Iraq and 815 in southern Iraq, between 29 October 1997 and 11 November 1997. Enclosed with this letter you will find two tables indicating the increasing gravity of these violations.

As you know, such grave acts by a permanent member of the Security Council constitute not only a violation of the sovereignty of an independent State and founding Member of the United Nations and of the Charter of the Organization, but also a violation of a principle laid down in Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which was adopted, as you and the world at large are aware, under special influence and pressure from the United States.

In the face of these continual violations, breaches and trespasses, and against a background of constant American threats and the possibility of the use of military means by the United States, Iraq will find itself forced, in the absence of any alternative, to defend its sovereignty and security.

We should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq
Baghdad, 12 November 1997

Enclosure I

[Original: Arabic]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Department of International Organizations and Conferences

Number of American air violations of northern and southern Iraq
between 29 October and 11 November 1997

northern Iraq	southern Iraq
169	815

Total: 984

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Enclosure II

Number of sorties of enemy warplanes over the two no-fly zones
between 29 October and 11 November 1997

Dates	Sorties over northern Iraq	Sorties over southern Iraq	Sorties of the TR-1* over southern Iraq
29/10		44	1
30/10		39	1
31/10	12	35	1
1/11	24	49	1
2/11	12	47	1
3/11	26	69	1
4/11	22	81	
5/11	18	87	1
6/11	28	60	
7/11	15	45	1
8/11		51	1
9/11		58	1
10/11	12	76	
11/11		63	1
Subtotal	169	804	11

* The TR-1 is an American reconnaissance spy plane which flies at an altitude of 20,000 metres and at a speed of 600 km/hour over southern Iraq only.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1997/882
13 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1133 (1997) of 20 October 1997, in which the Council requested me to submit, no later than 15 November, a comprehensive report, including a detailed plan, a timetable and financial implications, for the holding of the referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the settlement plan and the agreements reached between the parties for its implementation. In order that the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) may proceed with its identification tasks, the Council decided, by the same resolution, to extend the mandate of the Mission until 20 April 1998 and to increase its strength in accordance with the recommendation contained in my report of 24 September (S/1997/742 and Add.1).

2. The present report covers developments since that report, including the steps taken by my Acting Special Representative, Mr. Erik Jensen, for the resumption of the identification process and other activities under the settlement plan. It includes my observations and recommendations on MINURSO's deployment for the full implementation of the plan and the agreements reached by the parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y del Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), during the direct talks held under the auspices of my Personal Envoy, Mr. James A. Baker III.

II. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD

United Nations technical assessment mission

3. As envisaged in my report of 24 September 1997, I dispatched a technical team to the Mission area from 7 to 15 October, to reassess the resource requirements of MINURSO for fulfilment of the settlement plan. The team held extensive discussions with MINURSO at its headquarters in Laayoune and undertook field visits to various localities in Western Sahara and to the Tindouf area in Algeria. During its mission, the team was received by representatives of the

two parties and also held informal consultations with the head of the observer delegation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to MINURSO.

4. The technical mission enabled the United Nations to update the logistic, personnel and other resource requirements for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength, which were last reviewed in my predecessor's report to the Security Council of 30 March 1995 (S/1995/240). Its work also made it possible to assess in more detail the operational requirements and cost estimate of MINURSO.

Identification process

5. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1133 (1997), preparatory work was undertaken to ensure the resumption of the identification operation by 1 December. Identification files stored in the United Nations Office at Geneva were returned to Laayoune on 23 and 29 October, and a last shipment to Tindouf was completed on 6 November. Requirements for the initial reopening of four identification centres were assessed, and arrangements made with the parties to have the centres restored to full working order. In this connection, the Government of Algeria has been approached regarding the need to provide to MINURSO additional accommodation for the resumption of identification in Tindouf.

6. My Acting Special Representative held extensive high-level discussions with the parties, both of which reiterated their commitment to resuming identification expeditiously and proceeding in accordance with the practical measures agreed to during the fourth round of direct talks, held at Houston, Texas, from 14 to 16 September 1997 (see S/1997/742, annex III). The parties were informed of MINURSO's plan to open 12 centres in all, 9 of which would function concurrently. Morocco expressed readiness to provide all practical support for the resumption of identification. The Frente POLISARIO agreed to make available most of the premises previously organized as identification centres. Discussions were also held on updating the list of sheikhs eligible to testify and on arrangements for selecting and agreeing in advance to a list of alternates. With respect to the convocation lists, my Acting Special Representative granted both parties one week to check the applicants' current addresses and a maximum of three weeks to ensure that people are notified, wherever they may be. Applicants will be convoked only once, and no further applications will be accepted, barring those from any Saharan political detainees and prisoners of war. The matter of individuals, such as prisoners of war, who had thus far been excluded from applying to the referendum was also discussed by my Acting Special Representative with the parties.

7. As agreed to during the second round of direct talks, held in London on 19 and 20 July 1997 (ibid., annex I), my Acting Special Representative also notified the parties of the results, by number, of the identification process to date.

Military and civilian police aspects

8. As at 7 November 1997, the strength of the military component of MINURSO, headed by the Force Commander, Major-General Bernd S. Lubenik (Austria), stood at 223 (see annex I to the present report). Pending the commencement of the

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transitional period, the military mandate of MINURSO remains restricted to monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, which came into effect on 6 September 1991. MINURSO military observers continue to conduct daily ground patrols and helicopter reconnaissance and both the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente POLISARIO forces continue to be cooperative.

9. During the reporting period, the Secretariat consulted 22 Member States for possible contribution to the civilian police component of MINURSO, to assist the Identification Commission in its tasks. As at 10 November, 11 positive responses had been received, providing a sufficient number of police officers for the identification operation. The first four civilian police contingents are scheduled to arrive at MINURSO headquarters between 21 and 23 November 1997. Four Member States were consulted for the selection of candidates to the post of Police Commissioner.

Other aspects of the settlement plan

10. On 10 October, the independent jurist, Professor Emmanuel Roucounas, informed Mr. M'hamed Khaddad, Frente POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO, of his readiness to undertake a further mission to the region. He asked Mr. Khaddad to provide him by 15 November with any new information regarding Saharan political prisoners and detainees which he could then submit to the Moroccan authorities. On 25 October, my Acting Special Representative informed the Moroccan authorities of the independent jurist's proposal to visit the region in November, in the event they could provide specific information on the 167 alleged political prisoners and detainees whose names were on the list they had received in January 1997 (see S/1997/742, para. 18).

11. During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued preparatory work for the repatriation of Saharan refugees. In this connection, UNHCR participated in the United Nations technical mission to the region from 7 to 15 October and refined its repatriation plan.

III. PLAN AND TIMETABLE FOR THE HOLDING OF THE REFERENDUM

12. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1133 (1997), a plan for the organization and conduct of the referendum is provided below, including an overview of the main elements of the settlement plan and the agreements reached during the direct talks, as well as activities to be undertaken accordingly. The timetable is in annex II to the present report.

13. In this regard, it may be useful to recall the main elements of the settlement plan. During the transitional period, the United Nations is to organize and conduct, in cooperation with OAU, a referendum in the Territory to enable the people of Western Sahara to choose freely, without administrative or military constraints, between independence and integration with Morocco. To this end, the ceasefire is to be followed by an exchange of prisoners of war, a reduction in the Moroccan troops in the Territory and confinement of the combatants of both sides to specific locations. To ensure that the necessary conditions exist for the holding of a free and fair referendum, the United

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Nations will monitor other aspects of the administration of the Territory, especially the maintenance of law and order. Following the proclamation of an amnesty, Saharan political prisoners will be released. All laws or regulations that might impede the holding of a free and fair referendum will be suspended as deemed necessary. Following the promulgation of a general and complete amnesty for all refugees and others outside the Territory who wish to return, they will be enabled to do so by the United Nations, after the latter has established their right to vote.

Authority of the United Nations and transitional period

14. In the 1988 proposals of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairman of OAU for the settlement of the question of Western Sahara (S/21360, part I), the two parties recognized that sole and exclusive responsibility for the organization and conduct of the referendum was vested in the United Nations. In their Houston declaration of 16 September 1997 (S/1997/742, annex III), the two parties stated that the United Nations was required by the settlement plan to organize and conduct a referendum that is free, fair and transparent and free from all constraints, both for participants and accredited observers. The parties stated that, accordingly, the powers and authorities of the United Nations during the transitional period would apply to ensure, among other things, complete freedom of speech and assembly, and of the press, as well as freedom of movement for personnel and property into, out of and within the Territory, thus creating a climate of public tranquillity within which a referendum free of all constraints, intimidation and harassment could be organized and conducted by the United Nations. My Special Representative would be authorized to issue regulations prohibiting graft, fraud, intimidation and harassment which could interfere with the organization and conduct of a free, fair and transparent referendum.

15. As may be recalled, the transitional period was to begin on "D-Day", with the coming into effect of the ceasefire on 6 September 1991, and was to end with the proclamation of the results of the referendum which was originally scheduled to be held in January 1992 (arrangements relating to the ceasefire are described in S/21360, paras. 51-53). However, the transitional period has been repeatedly postponed as a result of delays in preparatory work and the deadlock in the identification process, caused by differences between the parties over interpretation of the settlement plan.

16. In reviewing the plan for the holding of the referendum, it has been determined that the transitional period could start on 7 June 1998 (D-Day) and would end with the proclamation of the results of the referendum which could be held on 7 December 1998. I should like to stress, however, that this could be achieved only if identification is resumed and completed as agreed by the parties in London on 19 July and in Houston on 16 September (S/1997/742, annexes I and III) and if all other provisions of the settlement plan are implemented with the full cooperation of the parties and full support of the Security Council.

Release of Saharan political prisoners and detainees

17. During the third round of direct talks, held at Lisbon on 29 August 1997 (ibid., annex II), the parties agreed that, pursuant to the amnesty envisioned in the settlement plan, any and all Saharan political prisoners or detainees would be released before the beginning of the referendum campaign. They also agreed to cooperate fully with the independent jurist in carrying out his duties (described in S/21360, paras. 33 (b) and 70). In accordance with the original timetable, which provided for the release of Saharan political prisoners and detainees as soon as possible after D-Day, it is envisaged that this would be effected by D + 1 week, on 14 June 1998. This would enable any and all released Saharan political prisoners and detainees wishing to participate in the referendum to be interviewed and identified in time by the Identification Commission.

Release of prisoners of war

18. In Lisbon, the parties also agreed that all prisoners of war would be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of the settlement plan. They further agreed that they would continue their full cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) until the completion of the repatriation process. In accordance with the original timetable, which provided for the release of prisoners of war as soon as possible after D-Day, it is envisaged that this would also be effected by D + 1 week.

Reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory and confinement of troops from the two parties to designated locations

19. As further agreed between the parties in Lisbon, Moroccan armed forces will be reduced and confined or contained in all respects strictly in accordance with the provisions of the settlement plan (S/21360, paras. 54-56; S/22464 and Corr.1, paras. 14-15). As agreed by the parties and the two observer countries, Algeria and Mauritania, Frente POLISARIO armed forces will be confined or contained in locations and numbers to be designated by my Special Representative as called for in the plan, provided that no more than 2,000 combatants may be confined or contained in Western Sahara east of the sand berm and no more than 300 in Mauritania. Those over and above the number designated by my Special Representative for confinement or containment in the Territory east of the berm and in Mauritania will be confined or contained in Algeria. The locations of the troops to be confined or contained in Algeria and Mauritania will be identified in coordination with the Algerian and Mauritanian authorities. These arrangements are for the sole purpose of carrying out the referendum called for in the plan. They are not to alter or otherwise affect in any way the internationally recognized boundaries of Western Sahara and are not to serve as precedent for any argument that such boundaries have been altered.

20. Pursuant to the settlement plan (S/21360, para. 55), each party will inform me of the strength and location of its military forces one week before D-Day, by 1 June 1998. The plan (S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 14) indicated that Morocco was prepared to reduce its troops in the Territory to a level not exceeding 65,000 all ranks, within a period of 11 weeks from the start of the transitional period. The then Secretary-General accepted this as an appropriate, substantial

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and phased reduction in accordance with the settlement proposals. Accordingly, the reduction of Moroccan forces in the Territory is expected to be completed by 22 August 1998 and all those remaining, with the exceptions mentioned in the plan (S/21360, para. 56), would be confined by that date, with due account taken of the modalities and time required for the repatriation phase described in the present report. With regard to Frente POLISARIO forces, those who would not be eligible to vote would also be confined by that date, while all others would be regrouped with their immediate families and return to the Territory under the UNHCR repatriation programme outlined in the present report and in accordance with paragraph 74 of document S/21360.

Suspension of laws which might impede a free and fair referendum

21. Under the settlement plan (S/21360, paras. 33 (a) and 71), the Special Representative is to ensure, before the beginning of the referendum campaign, that the authorities involved suspend any law or measure which, in his judgement, could obstruct the conduct of a free and fair referendum and would not otherwise be superseded by the regulations, rules and instructions referred to in paragraph 58 of document S/21360. In accordance with the original timetable, which provided for any such law or measure to be suspended before the repatriation phase, this should be effected by 1 August 1998 (D + 8).

Repatriation of refugees, other Western Saharans resident outside the Territory and members of the Frente POLISARIO entitled to vote

22. The modalities for repatriation are described in paragraphs 33 (c) and (d) and 72 to 74 of document S/21360, and paragraphs 34 to 36 of document S/22464. The task of UNHCR, which is to carry out the repatriation programme as an integral part of the MINURSO operation, will be threefold: to ascertain and record the repatriation wishes of each Western Saharan registered as a voter by the Identification Commission; to issue the necessary documentation to the members of his or her immediate family; and to establish and manage, in cooperation with MINURSO, which will provide security, the reception centres that will be established in the Territory for the returning Western Saharans.

23. On 19 July, during their direct talks in London (S/1997/742, annex I), the parties concurred that UNHCR should begin the steps preparatory to the repatriation of refugees in accordance with the settlement plan, and agreed to cooperate with UNHCR in implementation of the repatriation programme in accordance with UNHCR's normal practice and established principles of voluntary repatriation. In this connection, it may be useful to recall those principles, taking due account of the overall mandate responsibilities of UNHCR and its role under the plan: namely, that repatriation should be voluntary and carried out under conditions of safety and dignity; refugees should have freedom of choice of intended destinations; voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable solution should be sustainable; returnees should have freedom of movement; and UNHCR's responsibilities extend to the monitoring, rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees.

24. In accordance with the settlement plan and UNHCR repatriation principles, MINURSO will ensure that all conditions conducive to safe return are met. These include the reduction and confinement of Moroccan troops present in the

Territory (paras. 19 and 20 above), the neutralization of paramilitary units in the existing police forces and arrangements for the maintenance of law and order during the transitional period (S/21360, paras. 67-69). A number of points at which returnees will be able to cross into the Territory will be designated by the Special Representative, and security at those crossing-points and at reception centres will be provided by the MINURSO Military Unit (ibid., para. 72). In this connection, mine clearing of designated repatriation routes and sites would be required, as envisaged in my predecessor's report to the Security Council of 30 March 1995 (S/1995/240, para. 33).

25. Also in accordance with the settlement plan (S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 34) and UNHCR repatriation principles, those who wish to return would do so with their immediate families. For this purpose it is envisaged that UNHCR would set up reception centres at or near the returnees' intended places of return and as close as possible to voting centres. These reception centres would be intended not as permanent but as transit stations. Returnees who might have relatives established in the Territory and wish to join them, or who might wish to leave the reception centres for other arrangements, should be enabled to do so. Others should be allowed to stay at these centres until the day of the referendum and arrangements would be made thereafter for their relocation and reintegration in their intended places of return.

26. UNHCR has taken into consideration in its planning the fact that, according to information available, more than 80 per cent of the refugees originated from areas in the western part and less than 20 per cent from the eastern part of the Territory. About 90 per cent of the estimated number of 120,000 potential returnees, comprising voters and members of their immediate families (105,000 from the Tindouf camps in Algeria, 10,000 from Mauritania and 5,000 from other areas) would be repatriated by air, and the others by road, to reception centres in five areas (three in the Territory west of the berm and two east of the berm). It should be stressed that these are indicative figures which will have to be readjusted on the basis of the final voters' list and each potential voter's wish to return to the Territory, as would be ascertained by UNHCR during the registration period.

27. UNHCR estimates that 15 weeks would be required for repatriation. If the referendum is to be held on 7 December 1998, repatriation would thus have to take place from D + 8 to D + 23 weeks (2 August-15 November). As the reduction and confinement of forces will not have been completed by then, MINURSO will ensure that the first groups of returnees will be repatriated in specific areas where the forces have already been reduced and confined at designated locations. To this effect, coordination between MINURSO and the Royal Moroccan Army will be essential.

28. A total budget of \$50 million, as was originally foreseen in 1996, would be required for the implementation of the UNHCR repatriation programme under the settlement plan, of which an estimated \$32 million would be for transport and logistics alone. An additional amount would be required for the UNHCR rehabilitation and reintegration programme in 1999 as foreseen in the proposed timetable, for which UNHCR would revert back separately after a further assessment of needs. UNHCR intends to launch a special appeal from mid-January 1998.

Organization and conduct of the referendum

29. Under the settlement plan (S/21360, para. 59), the responsibility of the United Nations in respect of the referendum is divided into three main areas: (a) identification and registration of those eligible to vote; (b) establishment of the conditions and modalities for a referendum campaign in which freedom of speech, assembly, movement and the press are guaranteed; and (c) conduct of the voting in a manner permitting participation by all eligible voters, without interference or intimidation, and ensuring the secrecy of the ballot. As may be recalled, the General Regulations for the Organization and Conduct of the Referendum in Western Sahara were issued on 8 November 1991 (S/26185, annex III), and the terms of reference of the Identification Commission on 26 April 1993 (ibid., annex II).

(a) Identification and registration of Saharan voters

30. As may be recalled, the identification process, launched by my Acting Special Representative in August 1994, came to a standstill late in 1995, as a result of the Frente POLISARIO's decision not to participate in the identification of members of tribal groupings H, I and J, except for persons included in the Spanish census of 1974 and their qualified family members. By December 1995, of a total of 77,058 persons convoked, 60,112 had been identified (a further 238 individuals who came before the Identification Commission were reclassified as members of a tribal group requiring identification on another occasion). Since all persons who have not yet been identified will be convoked once, including those who were convoked previously but not yet identified, some 117,000 persons remain to be convoked in accordance with the compromise agreement of the two parties, reached in London on 19 July 1997 (S/1997/742, annex I).

31. Under that agreement, the parties will not directly or indirectly sponsor or present for identification anyone from tribal groupings H41, H61 and J51/52 other than persons included in the 1974 census and their immediate family members, but the parties will not be obligated to actively prevent individuals from such tribal groups from presenting themselves. Identification of any such individuals who may present themselves is to proceed as soon as possible. Persons from all other tribal groups from census categories H, I and J may come forward to be identified. The parties acknowledge that, from the time of the original settlement plan, they have understood that credible oral testimony to the Identification Commission would be required, and they agree that in the identification process oral testimony will be received and considered by the Commission, as provided for in the plan.

32. The identification of potential voters in the referendum of Western Sahara is a highly intricate and time-consuming operation. As may be recalled, the 1974 Spanish census of the Territory divided the Saharan population into 88 tribes and sub-groups. Members of these groups are dispersed not only throughout Western Sahara, an area greater than the United Kingdom, but also in parts of Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco. As previously, identification sessions will have to be organized for almost every tribal sub-group at each centre, with two sheikhs present, one from each side, in addition to observers from Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO and OAU. To complete identification of all

remaining applicants, some 500 sessions will be required, with all the time and logistic complexity that this implies. A detailed programme has been drawn up which, with total cooperation on the part of both parties and no significant disruption due to weather conditions or any other causes, would permit completion of identification within 26 weeks, by 31 May 1998 (D - 1), and issuance of a consolidated list of Saharans judged eligible to vote by 7 June (D-Day). Following an estimated period of six weeks for the lodging and hearing of any appeals, the final list of eligible voters would be issued by the Special Representative on 26 July, upon authorization by me in consultation with the current Chairman of OAU as called for in the settlement plan (S/21360, para. 62).

(b) Referendum campaign

33. With regard to the establishment of the conditions and modalities for the conduct of the referendum campaign, the Special Representative will be assisted by a Referendum Commission (whose tasks are described in S/21360, paras. 63-66, and further detailed in S/22464 and Corr.1, paras. 25-31). This Commission will advise the Special Representative on measures necessary to ensure that the referendum is free and fair, without military or administrative constraints, and that there is no intimidation or interference in the referendum process. As with the Identification Commission, the two parties and OAU representatives will, as appropriate, be associated as official observers in the work of the Referendum Commission (S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 25). The Commission, whose terms of reference will be issued in due course, will become operational when the Identification Commission completes its work, upon issuance of the final list of eligible voters.

34. As stated by the parties in their Houston declaration of 16 September (S/1997/742, annex III), the Special Representative will be authorized to require that they will have equal access to all television and radio facilities for the purpose of broadcasting their respective views on the referendum. The Special Representative is to have access to television and radio facilities to the extent he deems appropriate, to disseminate publicly information about the referendum in order to inform all eligible voters about their rights and obligations.

35. Pursuant to the settlement plan (S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 29) and the code of conduct for the referendum campaign agreed to by the parties in Houston on 16 September (S/1997/742, annex III), the Special Representative will set the date for the commencement of the referendum campaign, which will be at such time as he is satisfied that all conditions are met for a free and fair campaign and which date will be three weeks prior to the date set for the referendum. No referendum campaign activities may commence prior to that date. Should these conditions be met by then, and the referendum set for 7 December 1998, the referendum campaign would thus take place from 16 November to 6 December. The code will govern the conduct and behaviour, during the referendum campaign, of the parties and persons or groups of persons approved by the Special Representative, supporting one or the other party participants in the referendum.

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(c) Holding of the referendum and proclamation of its results

36. The Referendum Commission will also advise the Special Representative on the actual conduct of the referendum (S/21360, para. 65; S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 37). Under the settlement plan (S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 30), an adequate number of polling stations are to be established throughout the Territory in order to give all eligible Western Saharans the opportunity to vote in the referendum. Voting will take place only in the Territory. The precise location of voting centres and number of polling stations will be determined on the basis of the data collected during the registration of voters, as well as existing population centres and areas where returning Western Saharans have been located. For planning purposes, it is estimated that up to 250 polling stations would be established at voting centres in seven localities in the Territory, five west of the berm and two east of the berm. These arrangements, as with regard to the locations for Frente POLISARIO troop confinement (para. 19 above), are to be for the sole purpose of carrying out the referendum called for in the plan. They are not to alter in any way the internationally recognized boundaries of Western Sahara and are not to serve as precedent for any argument that such boundaries have been altered.

37. The action to be taken by MINURSO after the proclamation of the referendum result is described in paragraphs 75 and 76 of document S/21360. Every effort will be made to complete that action as expeditiously as possible. As indicated in paragraph 36 of document S/22464, UNHCR will maintain a presence in the Territory, as necessary, in order to fulfil its monitoring role for returnees in accordance with its internationally accepted responsibilities.

IV. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS OF THE MISSION AT FULL STRENGTH

38. According to the settlement plan (S/21360, paras. 48-49 and 77-82; S/22464 and Corr.1, paras. 10-11 and 39-50), MINURSO consists of a Civilian Unit, a Security Unit (made up of civilian police) and a Military Unit, and functions as an integrated operation under the overall authority of the Special Representative.

Civilian Unit

39. The Civilian Unit comprises the following main components: the office of the Special Representative, including political, legal and public information officers who will provide support to him in the exercise of his responsibilities and authority as well as in his liaison and coordination functions; the Identification and Referendum Commissions and their support staff; and an administrative component.

40. The present authorized level of civilian staff is 167 (22 Professional, 41 General Service, 39 Field Service and 65 local staff). With the Mission's expansion under resolution 1133 (1997), the total number of civilian personnel considered necessary for the resumption and completion of the identification process is 384 (94 Professional, 126 General Service, 63 Field Service, 6 Security Service and 95 local staff). The number of civilian police personnel required to assist the Identification Commission is 81. These requirements are

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under consideration by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

41. For the full implementation of the settlement plan, it is considered that the present authorized staff level of the office of the Special Representative would remain sufficient and that this office would therefore not require additional posts. Nor would additional international staff be required for the Referendum Commission, as the latter would absorb qualified personnel of the Identification Commission. However, the administrative component would require 211 additional posts, of which 124 (31 Professional, 43 General Service and 50 Field Service posts) would be international, to strengthen the office of the Chief Administrative Officer and the administrative services functions, as well as the integrated support services to the military and civilian police components, in particular the supplies, land and air transport, movement control, engineering and communications services. This additional staff would have to be phased in between D - 18 and D - 10 weeks (1 February-31 March 1998). Approximately 750 polling officers would be deployed two weeks prior to the referendum, between 8 and 22 November 1998. It is envisaged that most polling officers would be contributed by Member States.

Military Unit

42. The tasks of the Military Unit of MINURSO are outlined in paragraph 81 of document S/21360. The Mission's original military requirements totalled 1,695 (all ranks), as follows: 550 military observers, an infantry battalion of 700, an air support group of 110 to operate and maintain four fixed-wing aircraft and eight transport helicopters, a signals unit of 45, a medical unit of 50, a composite military police company of 40 and a logistics battalion of 200 (S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 48). In my predecessor's report of 30 March 1995 (S/1995/240), it was considered that an engineering unit of about 100 (all ranks) would also be required to perform the following tasks: limited mine clearing, basic infrastructure repair, and the construction and operation of water points in specific areas essential to MINURSO operations.

43. Upon review, it has been determined that these requirements remain largely appropriate, although adjustments would have to be made to the size of certain units, as follows: 550 military observers, an infantry battalion of 800 comprising four deployable companies, a communication company of 130, a medical unit of 50, a military police company of 40, a logistics company of 130 and an engineering company of 150. The Mission's military component would thus total 1,850 (all ranks).

44. The military observers would be deployed in full strength between D - 4 weeks and D - 1 week. In the original timetable, the infantry battalion was to be deployed during the reduction phase of the Moroccan forces present in the Territory, immediately before the implementation of the repatriation programme (S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 49). However, in reviewing the deployment plan, it has been determined that it would not be logistically possible to deploy the infantry battalion during that phase, as useable infrastructure is limited to one main road in the Territory and one main port (Agadir). To ensure orderly deployment and assist MINURSO military observers in their monitoring tasks, it is considered necessary to phase in the infantry battalion before the reduction

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of Moroccan forces, i.e., between D - 3 weeks and D-Day. If so, the logistics and other military support units would have to be deployed between D - 10 and D - 8 weeks (30 March-12 April), with the exception of the engineering company which should be phased in from 1 February (D - 18), to start its demining and other required tasks.

Civilian Police Unit

45. The security and monitoring functions of the MINURSO civilian police are outlined in paragraph 79 of document S/21360. Relevant directives are also provided in paragraphs 6, 7, 9 and 15 of the code of conduct for the referendum campaign (S/1997/742, annex III).

46. According to the original requirements (S/22464 and Corr.1, para. 46), the civilian police component of MINURSO was to total 300 officers. As indicated in paragraph 40 above, 81 civilian police officers are currently required to assist the Identification Commission in its tasks. While taking into account the fact that security would also be provided by the Military Unit (infantry battalion) of MINURSO (para. 24 above), it is considered that 319 additional civilian police officers would be required for fulfilment of their tasks under the settlement plan, bringing the total strength of the Civilian Police Unit to 400. Of these, the Police Commissioner would require as soon as possible the services of 20 officers to manage the civilian police district headquarters in Laayoune and Tindouf and to provide back-up support to the civilian police deployed at the various centres during the identification process. The remaining officers would be phased in during the transitional period, in close coordination with the UNHCR repatriation programme. The Special Representative will continue to keep the civilian police requirements under review.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

47. By its resolution 51/2 B of 13 June 1997, the General Assembly appropriated \$30,229,800 gross for the maintenance of MINURSO, at its current strength, for the period from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998, to be assessed at the monthly rate of \$2,519,150 gross, subject to the decision by the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission. I shall submit an addendum to this report shortly, to provide the financial implications for the full deployment of MINURSO as outlined in paragraphs 41 to 46 above. In this regard, resources in preparation for the transitional period, as indicated in paragraph 54 below, will be requested from the General Assembly.

48. As at 7 November 1997, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURSO special account for the period since inception to 20 October 1997 amounted to \$45.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 7 November 1997 was \$1,620.3 million.

VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

49. This is the first time since the establishment of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464 and Corr.1) that it has been possible to undertake an exhaustive and concrete review of the practical steps required to fulfil the United Nations mandate in Western Sahara. The plan and timetable proposed in the present report are the results of this review. As a paramount requirement, the provisions of the settlement plan and agreements reached during the direct talks between the parties were fully respected. Inevitably, however, some adjustments to the 1991 original timetable had to be made, in order to take the following requirements into account: that the referendum be held before the end of 1998; that appropriate time be given to UNHCR to implement its repatriation programme; and that the originally agreed time required for the reduction of Moroccan troops present in the Territory and for the referendum campaign be maintained.

50. I should like to stress that the proposed plan and timetable are based on a best-case scenario, that is, on the assumption that MINURSO and UNHCR will be provided with all the financial resources necessary to deploy in a timely manner, that full authority for implementation of the settlement plan and the agreements reached is vested in the Special Representative as called for in the plan, that the two parties and the two observer countries will cooperate fully with MINURSO, and that the Security Council will continue to extend its full support for fulfilment of the United Nations mandate in Western Sahara.

51. Unless all these essential conditions are met throughout the implementation of the settlement plan, it will not be possible to hold the referendum before the end of 1998, if at all. In this connection, I count especially on the full cooperation of the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO leadership with respect to all aspects of the plan, including the resumption and completion of the identification process, maintenance of the ceasefire and the reduction and confinement of troops, the release of prisoners of war and Saharan political detainees, the voluntary repatriation of all Saharans eligible to vote and their immediate families, and facilitation of the referendum campaign. All these steps are aimed at achieving the ultimate objective of the plan, which is to enable the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination by choosing, in a free, fair and transparent referendum, between independence and integration with Morocco.

52. As may be recalled, my Personal Envoy concluded after his exploratory mission in late April 1997 that neither Morocco nor the Frente POLISARIO wished to pursue any political solution other than implementation of the settlement plan. This means that, in the view of the parties, the referendum under the plan remains the best framework for settling the Western Sahara conflict. It is therefore incumbent upon the parties to abide fully by the letter and spirit of the plan and agreements reached during their direct talks, including respect for the sole and exclusive responsibility of the United Nations for all matters relating to the organization and conduct of the referendum. As underlined in my previous report (S/1997/742), only the genuine commitment of the parties will determine whether it is possible to fulfil the objectives of the plan. At this important juncture, I urge the parties to refrain from any statement or action which could create tension or undermine the process leading to the referendum.

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53. It should also be emphasized that, in view of a few as yet undetermined variables, the time allotted for some of the implementation stages is indicative and may eventually be shorter or longer than that foreseen in the present report. This concerns in particular the period required for repatriation, which will obviously depend on the final number of potential voters and their immediate families who would wish to return to the Territory. In accordance with the authority conferred to him under the settlement plan, my Special Representative will determine, in consultation with me, whether circumstances require any alteration in the timetable.

54. The timely and successful resumption and completion of the identification process will be a determining factor for the start of the transitional period and full implementation of the settlement plan. It is important to note, however, that in addition to the conditions set out in paragraphs 50 and 51 above, all the administrative and logistic steps required for fulfilment of the plan must be taken in a timely manner so that the referendum may be held before the end of 1998. If D-Day is to be declared on 7 June as proposed in the timetable annexed to the present report, all advance deployment and preparatory work requiring financial commitment from the General Assembly would need to commence by 19 January 1998.

55. On this basis, I recommend that the Security Council authorize the expansion of MINURSO for the full implementation of the settlement plan as outlined in this report, in order to enable contributing Member States and the Mission to proceed on time with preparations for full deployment.

56. Pursuant to resolution 1133 (1997), I shall report regularly to the Security Council on progress made in the implementation of the settlement plan and the agreements reached between the parties. In this connection, it is my intention to provide to the Council, by 15 January 1998, detailed information on the progress of the identification operation which is to be resumed on 1 December 1997, and to confirm that the transitional period may start on 7 June 1998 as planned.

57. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to my Acting Special Representative for his effective leadership of the Mission since March 1994 and for his untiring efforts in moving the peace process forward, in particular his contribution to the achievements made so far in the identification process and to the success of the direct talks under the auspices of my Personal Envoy. I also pay tribute to the Force Commander and to all the MINURSO staff for their contribution to peace in Western Sahara.

Annex IComposition of the military component of the United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

	Authorized strength as at 7 November 1997		
	Military observers	Support units	Total
Argentina	1		1
Austria	4		4
Bangladesh	6		6
China	16		16
Egypt	19		19
El Salvador	2		2
France	25		25
Ghana	6	7 ^a	13
Greece	1		1
Guinea	3		3
Honduras	12		12
Ireland	8		8
Italy	5		5
Kenya	8		8
Malaysia	13		13
Nigeria	5		5
Pakistan	5		5
Poland	3		3
Portugal	4		4
Republic of Korea	0	14 ^b	14
Russian Federation	25		25
Uruguay	13		13
United States of America	15		15
Venezuela	<u>3</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	202	21	223

^a Force orderly room.^b Medical personnel.

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Annex II

Estimated timetable for the implementation
of the settlement plan

<u>Date</u>	<u>Action</u>
21 October-30 November 1997 (D - 33 to D - 27)	Preparations for the resumption of the identification operation.
1 December 1997-31 May 1998 (D - 27 to D - 1)	Identification operation (remaining applicants are interviewed by the Identification Commission).
By 16 December 1997 (D - 25)	UNHCR finalizes the repatriation plan.
4 January-7 June 1998 (D - 22 to D-Day)	UNHCR staff and equipment are phased in.
4 January-19 July 1998 (D - 22 to D + 6)	UNHCR preparation of departure and reception sites for repatriation.
Not later than 19 January 1998 (D - 20)	Start of bidding for MINURSO requirements (including food, water, fuel, transport services, refurbishing of sites). UNHCR issues special appeal for funds.
1 February-30 March 1998 (D - 18 to D - 10)	Phase-in of additional administrative staff needed during the deployment and later in support of the deployed military formed units.
1-14 February 1998 (D - 18 to D - 16)	The engineering unit (demining capability) is deployed.
1 February-12 April 1998 (D - 18 to D - 8)	Collection of information on minefields at designated repatriation routes and sites. Demining of specific routes and sites for the deployment of additional military observers and formed units, to construct additional team sites and prepare areas for the construction of military camps.
15 February-22 August 1998 (D - 16 to D + 11)	Potential returnees are interviewed and registered by UNHCR.
30 March-12 April 1998 (D - 10 to D - 8)	The logistics units are deployed.
30 March 1998 (D - 10)	UNHCR starts planning reintegration and rehabilitation programme.
13 April-25 July 1998 (D - 8 to D + 7)	Demining of designated repatriation routes and sites is completed.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Action</u>
11-31 May 1998 (D - 4 to D - 1)	The balance of the military observer component is phased in.
18 May-7 June 1998 (D - 3 to D-Day)	The infantry battalion is phased in.
1 June 1998 (D - 1)	Each party informs the Secretary-General of the strength and location of its military forces.
7 June 1998 (D-Day)	The transitional period begins. The consolidated list of Saharans judged eligible to vote is published in the Mission area, together with instructions for appeals against non-inclusion of names in the published list. Troop confinement begins.
7 June-22 August 1998 (D-Day to D + 11)	Moroccan forces present in the Territory are reduced to a maximum of 65,000 and confined to designated locations.
By 14 June 1998 (D + 1)	Amnesties for Saharan political detainees as well as returnees are proclaimed by the Government of Morocco. Any and all Saharan political detainees are released. Prisoners of war are released under ICRC auspices.
20 June 1998 (D + 2)	Deadline for submission of any appeals regarding the list of persons judged eligible to vote.
21 June-20 July 1998 (D + 2 to D + 6)	The Identification Commission hears appeals.
20 July-8 November 1998 (D + 6 to D + 22)	The balance of the civilian police component is phased in, in coordination with the repatriation of Saharans eligible to vote.
26 July 1998 (D + 7)	The Special Representative issues the final list of voters as approved by the Secretary-General.
Not later than 1 August 1998 (D + 8)	Paramilitary units in the existing police are neutralized. All laws or measures that could obstruct a free and fair referendum are suspended.
2 August 1998 (D + 8)	On the basis of the final list of eligible voters and of each voter's wish to return, UNHCR starts repatriation to specific areas where troop reduction and confinement have been completed.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Action</u>
Not later than 22 August 1998 (D + 11)	Troop confinement is completed, including POLISARIO combatants whose names are not in the final list of eligible voters. UNHCR continues with repatriation at full strength.
8-22 November 1998 (D + 22 to D + 24)	Polling staff is phased in.
By 15 November 1998 (D + 23)	Repatriation is completed.
16 November-6 December 1998 (D + 23 to D + 26)	The referendum campaign takes place.
7 December 1998 (D + 26)	Referendum.
Within 72 hours	The referendum results are proclaimed.
Immediately thereafter	The withdrawal of MINURSO personnel begins. UNHCR starts rehabilitation and reintegration programme.
January 1999	MINURSO's monitoring responsibilities arising from the referendum results are completed. Remaining MINURSO personnel withdraw from the Mission area.





Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/882/Add.1
19 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION
CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

Addendum

1. With reference to paragraph 47 of my report of 13 November 1997 (S/1997/882), I wish to inform the Council that the cost of the expansion of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for the full implementation of the settlement plan, based on the timetable set out in annex II to that report, is estimated at \$129 million.
2. The estimate provides for the emplacement of 347 military observers, 1,273 military contingent personnel, 319 civilian police observers, supported by a civilian establishment of some 120 international civilian staff, 90 locally recruited staff and 750 polling officers. It also provides for the acquisition of equipment, supplies and services and other necessary logistical requirements.
3. A breakdown of the estimated requirements is provided for information purposes, by main category of expenditure, in the annex to the present addendum.
4. It is my intention to propose to the General Assembly, should the Security Council authorize the expansion of MINURSO for the full implementation of the settlement plan, that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the Special Account for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

Annex

Cost estimates for the expansion of the United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara for the
full implementation of the settlement plan

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	Cost estimate
1. Military personnel costs	36 900
2. Civilian personnel costs	36 800
3. Premises/accommodation	11 000
4. Infrastructure repairs	700
5. Transport operations	10 900
6. Air operations	9 500
7. Naval operations	-
8. Communications	600
9. Other equipment	2 000
10. Supplies and services	2 400
11. Election-related supplies and services	400
12. Public information programmes	200
13. Training programmes	-
14. Mine-clearing programmes	3 100
15. Disarmament and demobilization programmes	-
16. Air and surface freight	11 000
17. Staff assessment	<u>3 500</u>
Total, lines 1-17	<u>129 000</u>



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/883
13 November 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 NOVEMBER 1997 FROM THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE
SPECIAL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT
TO PARAGRAPH 9 (b) (i) OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should inform you, and through you, the members of the Security Council, that the Director of the Special Commission's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC) received, at 1725 hours local time in Baghdad, the attached letter from the Foreign Ministry of the Government of Iraq. The letter states that American personnel attached to the BMVC should leave Iraq immediately, today, via the Baghdad-Amman highway.

Also attached to the present letter is the reply I asked to be passed to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry.

Given that the Government of Iraq has decided not to comply with the decision of the Council expressed in resolution 1137 (1997), I have decided that the majority of the Special Commission personnel should be withdrawn from Iraq temporarily.

I intend that a skeleton staff remain in Baghdad to maintain the Commission's premises and equipment. It remains my hope that the Commission's work can be resumed in full and without restriction at the earliest possible date.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Richard BUTLER



S/1997/883
English
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Annex I

Letter dated 13 November 1997 from the Foreign Ministry
of the Government of Iraq addressed to the Director
of the Special Commission's Baghdad Monitoring and
Verification Centre

Further to my letter of 29 October 1997, I have the honour to inform you of the decision of the Government of Iraq that the American personnel of the BMVC should leave Iraq immediately today 13 November 1997 via Baghdad-Amman highway.

I request that you take the necessary action in accordance with this decision.

Adnan Malik
Head of the Department of
International Organizations
and Conferences

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Annex II

Letter dated 13 November 1997 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to the Director of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre with his reply to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry

Please prepare a letter in the following terms and take it immediately to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. Please obtain an immediate reply, if necessary by waiting at the Foreign Ministry. Please also let me know immediately of their reply.

Text

In reply to your letter of 13 November 1997, regarding the departure from Iraq of UNSCOM personnel of United States nationality, on instructions from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, I wish to advise you of the following.

It has been decided to remove from Iraq all UNSCOM personnel with the exception of a small office staff led by General Carlstrom, the Director of BMVC. The staff to depart from Iraq will include all inspection and monitoring staff, including those of United States nationality.

Arrangements have been made for the UNSCOM aircraft to land at Habbaniyah at 0715 on 14 November. The aircraft would depart for Bahrain at 0800. It is our intention that all our personnel who would be leaving Baghdad should be on that aircraft.

Under these circumstances, you are requested to not insist that UNSCOM personnel of United States nationality leave by road from Baghdad to Amman on 13 November, but accept instead my assurances that those personnel would leave on the UNSCOM aircraft at 0800 on 14 November.

Because of the short time of notice, I must ask for an immediate decision and reply to this request.

I have taken note of the oral assurances you gave to General Carlstrom with respect to the safety of all UNSCOM personnel at all times.

Text ends

Richard BUTLER
